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The possibility that the System Safety discipline, as
practiced by the Department of Defense and particularly
the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) , acts as a
significant barrier to the utilization of System Safety
technology in the acquisition process is analyzed. Spe-
cific areas including contracting procedures, contracting
documentation, specifications, regulations and administra-
tive procedures are investigated. Emphasis is placed on




The objective of this thesis is to demonstrate that a
number of serious barriers exist which preclude the utiliza-
tion of an effective System Safety technology in the Depart-
ment of Defense, particularly within the Naval Air Systems
Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM)
.
Roughly, the System Safety discipline is but a decade
old. A lengthy tri-service military specification describes
and directs its implementation. Starting with the Air Force,
the Army and Navy, in turn implemented its use. Each serv-
ice, more-or-less , went its own way in interpreting how the
program was to be exercised inasmuch as DOD guidance was
either minimal or nonexistent. Consequently, each service
and the other agencies have differences in contracting pro-
cedures, contracting documentation, specifications, regula-
tions, and administrative procedures.
Contractors were interviewed to determine on a compara-
tive basis just where the NAVAIRSYSCOM ranked in terms of
overall performance. Results were not complimentary to the
Navy. Air Force and Navy safety organizations and, to a
limited degree, Army organizations were visited to ascertain
operating differences.
A number of barriers were enumerated for DOD organiza-
tions and are listed in Chapter V.A. , Conclusions. For the
NAVAIRSYSCOM, it was found that the safety office lacked
support outside of its own office and that it failed to

provide sufficient instruction within all directives dealing
with contractual and project management matters. It also
failed to enforce current project charters which assign
"Safety Principals" to be responsive to safety matters.
The NAVAIRSYSCOM also failed to provide the instructional
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I. INTRODUCTION
The first aerospace accident was the mythological fall
of Icarus. He flew too close to the sun so that the bees-
wax which held his wing feathers together melted. He then
plunged into the ocean and drowned. (1)
Assuming some poetic license, Daedalus, father of
Icarus, had performed a number of tasks to assure a success-
ful first flight. He had inspected all feathers, all wax
and all other materials used under his Quality Control Pro-
gram. He had selected the right feather sizes and had them
assembled in the proper places to assure reliable perform-
ance. He had done one other thing under his System Safety
Program: Daedalus had performed a "Hazard Analysis" and had
subsequently warned Icarus of his findings, i.e., to fly a
middle course, neither too low (where moisture would in-
crease his weight unbearably) nor too high (where the sun's
heat would melt the beeswax)
.
Unlike the mythological flight described above, man in
his infinite wisdom succeeded in finding ways to break his
bond from land and soar to great heights, over great dis-
tances at high speeds. As with many other innovations pur-
sued expressly for the betterment of man, flying machines
and other equally ingenious devices have also been adapted
for the destruction of man. Unfortunately, history tells
us, destructive machines used against intended enemy victims
10

are likewise destructive to their owners, users, operators
and unintended victims through accident.
At present, the federal government is supporting a
number of systems safety programs on a number of projects
in several agencies and departments. Current examples in-
clude the Air Bag (Department of Transportation) , the ill-
fated B-l Bomber (Air Force) , the Cruise Missile (Navy)
,
and the Space Shuttle (NASA)
.
It is very difficult to measure their effectiveness.
In short, there is a need to determine what constitutes an
effective System Safety Program; what tasks must one do to
assume that the system safety portion of any given project
is successful, productive.
A. BACKGROUND
The first formal application of production techniques
began in the 1800 's. Quality Control was a fully recog-
nized discipline in the early 1900 's. Reliability came
into range roughly in the 1930' s, followed by Maintainabil-
ity in the 1940' s, and Value Engineering in the late 1950' s.
The first formal mention of a discipline called "System
Safety" did not appear until 1961. At this time, Air Force
General Blanchard provided a keynote address to a USAF
Commanders Conference. Shortly thereafter, the "Minuteman"
project became the first Department of Defense (DOD) project
which incorporated a requirement to perform contractually
binding system safety program tasks. The contract included
11

a System Safety Program Specification (MIL-S-38130) , a Sys-
tem Safety Program Statement of Work, and deliverable safety
data items.
In turn, the Army and Navy members of the Defense Depart-
ment followed suit. The Navy's first contractual safety
application occurred in 1969 within the F-14 contract
awarded to Grumman Aerospace, Inc., Bethpage Long Island,
by the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIRSYSCOM) . That year,
safety requirements were subsequently included in the S-3A
Aircraft award to Lockheed and the JIFDATS (Joint In-Flight
Data Transmission System) award to Northrop Corporation.
Figure 1 shows which projects considered a contractual
safety effort, and for the years shown, illustrates rapid
growth.
"System Safety" represents the next youngest discipline
in the NAVAIRSYSCOM, "Survivability" being the youngest.
Nevertheless, it is not so young (almost 10 years old) that
barriers preventing efficient implementation should not be
readily uncovered; explored and dealt with.
B. OBJECTIVE
The objective of any System Safety Program is to prevent
accidents and conserve resources. The objectives of this
thesis are to demonstrate that a number of barriers exist
which preclude the utilization of an effective System Safety
technology, and show that these problems represent a signifi-
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The major source of data used as a primary basis for
analysis was obtained through personal interviews conducted
by the author.
Thirteen personal interviews were conducted at five
major corporations. Three individuals were safety depart-
ment heads, the balance were practicing safety engineers.
The interviewees included members from Air Research Corp.,
Tucson, Arizona; General Dynamics, San Diego, California;
Grumman Aerospace Corp., Bethpage, Long Island, New York;
Hughes Aircraft, Culver City, California; and Rohr, San
Diego, California.
One telephone interview and eleven personal interviews
were held with safety members from five Department of Defense
organizations. These were: Army Headquarters Safety Office,
Washington, D.C.; the Naval Air Systems Command, Washington,
D.C.; the Air Force Safety Center, Norton AFB; the Air Force
Space and Missile Systems Organization (SAMSO) , Los Angeles,
California; and the Navy Safety Center, Norfolk, Virginia
(telephone interview)
.
Additionally, interviews were held with members from
respective Army, Navy and Air Force Cost Analysis groups.
All are located in Washington, D.C.
Finally, 20 Navy Commanding Officers/Executive Officers
from as many organizations in the fleet volunteered to com-
plete a questionnaire at a Naval Postgraduate School safety
class subsequent to an hour lecture by the author. The
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lecture described broad system safety concepts and provided
some safety definitions.
All interviews began with an explanation of the nature
of the research. The interviews were not formalized but
were tailored to the interviewee. They were intended to
provide the author with candid, uninhibited opinions regarding
the conduct of DOD, particularly NAVAIRSYSCOM, system safety
activity. Accordingly, interviewees were advised that
neither their names nor their respective companies would be





All of the services, of course, want to achieve the same
safety objective, i.e., to consciously preclude accidents
from happening, and/or to diminish their frequency of occur-
rence through some deliberate effort.
A technology exists which when exercised makes it possible
to achieve this objective. This technology was initially
developed by Bell Telephone Laboratories in the early 1960*s
in response to safety requirements imposed on the "Minuteman"
project by the Air Force Systems Command. If one could
imagine a recipe which would require one to:
1. Collect data developed under the same contract award
from the other "ilities" such as Quality, Maintain-
ability, Value Engineering, Survivability, etc.
2. Review historical accident and failure data avail-
able from safety centers, and field and other banks.
3. Emulate the technical and documentational techniques
developed for the reliability discipline. To this
add a probability of occurrence judgement and
severity description assuming an accident will occur.
4. Manipulate all of the above beginning with the
system's concept phase and withdraw all action upon
systems disposal.
5. Make appropriate hardware and/or operational
changes
.
The above constitutes the basic ingredient of a safety pro-
gram. All are described in more detail in "The Safety
Standard," MIL-STD-882, System Safety Program for Systems
and Associated Subsystems and Equipment.
16

1. Phases of Acquisition Process
One of MIL-STD-882 requirements is that a safety
program should commence as early as possible in the acquisi-
tion process. If the above "recipe" were to be properly
followed during the concept or development phases of a
major weapon system, the end product would be a list of
identified hazards pronounced against production hardware
which is yet to be built. At worst, the hazards would be
pronounced against hardware still in prototype phases. The
obvious advantage is that time is available to make low-
cost drawing paper changes now rather than expensive ECP
(Engineering Change Proposal) production changes or retrofit
changes later. Figure 2 is a sample of one such hazard.
2. End Product of Safety Program
Figure 2 represents one F-14 aircraft hazard dis-
covered by the prime contractor's safety organization. It
was delivered among others as part of a quarterly delivery
from the contractor to the government for bilateral consider-
ation between the government and contractor project manage-
ment. Briefly, Figure 2 describes catastrophic hazard
number 12 4 found by a contractor safety engineer performing
an OHA (Operational Hazard Analysis) in accordance with MIL-
STD-882 and the requirements of the development contract.
This analysis was performed several weeks before a prototype,
live missile firing test was to take place. It was deter-
mined by the safety analyst that if the test were to have
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An erroneous missile fly-off trajectory was assumed by an
aircraft designer in locating the fuel vent. The missile
plume would have ignited the fuel system through the mis-
located fuel vent.
3. Results and Purpose of Safety Program
In exercising his development contract, a contrac-
tor normally performs such tasks as reliability, maintain-
ability, quality assurance, survivability, human factors,
etc. It is possible that each of these disciplines may
find hazards as chance by-products of their efforts, or
they may not . Figure 2, potential hazard no. 123, for
example, represents a condition where the vent system was
of reliable design, it was maintainable, and of quality
construction. Yet, a hazard existed.
The express purpose of the System Safety discipline
is to focus on safety by choice, not chance. This is done
essentially by having skilled safety engineers using
specialized analysis techniques analyze each system and
subsystem. The entire scenario is considered. The system
and its operators (pilots, maintenancemen, repairmen, over-
haulers, movers, testers, handlers of every nature, etc.)
using anticipated procedures in their respective "real-
world" environment are considered. These analyses are done
at a point in time, primarily during the development phase,




By the time the F-14 aircraft contract expired 2>h
years later, 133 hazards were found. These were hazards
designated as either "critical" or "catastrophic." They
were delivered as they were discovered in quarterly install-
ments for subsequent project management consideration and
decision. Such is the goal of every system safety program,
to identify as many potential hazards as possible for reso-
lution before they are introduced to operating forces as
intrinsically deficient hardware, or in other cases, as
acceptable hardware but with a high potential for being
operated improperly.
B. JUSTIFICATION FOR SAFETY PROGRAM
After Icarus plunged into the ocean and lost his life
(and his wings) one could rationalize that he was of no loss
to the world. After all, Icarus would probably have been
the only pilot known to exist in the world at that time;
surely an eccentric at best. Icarus' mission was neither
destructive nor protective in any sense of the word. The
destruction of a few feathers and beeswax represented an
inconsequential economic loss.
The first controllable flying machines were constructed
in the early 1900 's. The pilots were daring soles seeking
adventure. Aircraft weights were in the order of hundreds
of pounds. Their energy sources consisted primarily of the
relatively few gallons of benzine carried aboard. In con-
trast, today's craft require well-trained, exceptionally
20

level-headed pilots. Present aircraft weights are in the
order of tens to hundreds of thousands of pounds. Energy
sources within the aircraft, just to name a few, are hun-
dreds of pounds of fuel, high pressure hydraulic systems,
high capacity oxygen systems, 50 to 100 kva electrical sys-
tems, high pressure and temperature pneumatic systems,
numerous types of explosive and pyrotechnic devices, high
temperature operating machinery, high-energy high-speed
rotating engines, etc., any malfunction or misuse of which
has a potential for catastrophy not existent in early craft.
When Icarus plunged into the ocean, one could conveni-
ently say that no property was damaged (save Icarus and his
wings). He didn't damage the ocean. In a very warped
sense, one might even say that he had contributed benefici-
ally to it; his body provided nutrients for aquatic life.
Considering the number of high energy sources mentioned
above about current aircraft, the same analogy could not be
made of today's aircraft accident. Much is left to chance
where property or facilities damage is concerned. If a
weapon aboard an aircraft were inadvertently launched while
flying over open waters, no facilities or property losses
would be expected. Given the same conditions aboard a
carrier, another disastrous conflagration such as that which
occurred on the Carriers Forrestal and Enterprise could be
the result. If an airplane fell out of the sky and crashed
in an apple orchard, the extent of property damage is limited
21

to the loss of a few apple trees, a nominal loss. If,
however, the same aircraft crashed into an operational
hangar, the facilities loss would be astronomical indeed.
At one time early in flight history, the pilot, naviga-
tor, bombardier, mechanic, and serviceman among other
things associated with a given aircraft was one and the
same man. At the other extreme, today, each of these tasks
and many more are performed by specialists. Specialists
requiring the use of special ground support equipment per-
form maintenance tasks on radar equipment, on engine and
flight control equipment, on communications equipment, on
a host of other equipments too numerous to mention; all of
which are far more complex than their counterparts were
just a few decades ago, if they existed at all.
1. Environment
The environment referred to here is not the air-
craft's well known operational environment. Rather, the
environmental conditions are those that influence its
development, or that impact the aircraft systems existence.
If the system as defined above were such that it
was miraculously devoid of any accident potential, for
whichever reasons (perfect Human Factors, Maintainability,
Reliability, operated by flawless people, etc.), there would













But accidents do happen. One needs not search very
far to recall how an accident influenced each of the above:
Air Force - F-lll (production cut)
NASA - Apollo 20 4 (1 entire crew and trainer capsule lost)
Army - Cheyenne (project scrapped)
Navy - Forrestal (lives lost, aircraft lost, extensive
repair)
Industry - Baton Rouge, La. (chlorine seepage from tanks,
city evacuated)
Additionally, the DOD clearly recognizes that public
pressure and economic climate have a very definite, profound
limiting influence upon its budget. Gone are the days of
the everflowing money cornucopia and indiscriminate cost-
plus-fixed-fee contracts.
2. Complexity of Weapon Systems
The preceding pages attempt to illustrate that
today's aircraft have far more and ever increasing energy
sources, the faulty or mistimed action of which, have poten-
tially far greater severity on any particular accident;
that aircraft are exceedingly complex in relation to designs
of those only several years ago; that each aircraft demands
much more specialized attention from many more types of
people (pilot, maintenance men, logistics, servicemen, navi-
gator, ordnancemen , etc.) than its elder counterpart did.
These are some of the dependent variables that skew the
indicator to the higher frequency side of the accident scale;
23

technological skill skews it toward the "safer" side. The
net effect, at least for aircraft accident rates, seems to
be a stalemate. Despite increased complexity, increasingly
frequent manipulations by greater numbers of people; the
accident rate, at least for aircraft, over the last decade
as shown in Figure 3 is, roughly, a stable one; perhaps
increasing slightly over the last few years.
3. Expense of Weapon Systems
In contrast, the costs associated with essentially
the same variables have been increasing steadily. Figure 4
is a rough indicator of an aircraft's relative development
cost. Any given weapon system produced today is far more
expensive, inflation notwithstanding, than its counterpart
was just a few decades ago. The cold, hard, unadulterable
aircraft statistics, for example, show that, in 19 53, when
reliable figures were first documented by the NAVSAFECEN,
the average cost of an accident to the Navy was about
$75,000. The same aircraft accident (not loss) cost figure
today is about $2,000,000, with costs going up almost
exponentially. The direct cost of aircraft loss due to
accidents in the three-year period from 1972 to 1975 was
$1,200,000,000 or about $400,000,000 each year. (21)
Fully one-third of these are due to material failures
or design deficiencies or both . This represents every bit of
$130,000,000 wasted this past fiscal year in Direct aircraft
costs only ; again, not considering intangible or unavailable





























































other ancillary equipments losses, lawsuit expenses and
compensations, court settlement fees, property damages, etc.
This incalculable total expense is a very real dollar
expense that gets paid for one way or another whether the
government can afford it or not. Directly or indirectly,
it in some unknown but real proportion reduces the Depart-
ment of Defense fiscal dollar allocations for research,
development, test, evaluation, production, overhaul, main-
tenance, etc. No project manager would refuse even one
l/100th of the much smaller $130,000,000 portion of the
total expense, yet, until within the last decade, virtually
no Navy positive preventive actions have been done to re-
duce these expenses. Most concerted past actions have been
corrective measures and have taken place after some dramatic
calamity occurs, only to be subdued or forgotten in time.
4. Benefit from a Safety Program
Is there benefit to a safety program? Yes, there
is benefit. "How much benefit is there"? one might ask.
Unfortunately, no simple answer exists because techniques
to measure proceeds from such an effort do not exist. The
business of the system safety program is to prevent undesir-
able events from occurring. How does one determine the
costs of what does not happen? Except in a few rare in-
stances, costs computed on the basis of estimates are argu-
able and indefensible. One rare defensible instance, for
the sake of argument, is the event shown in Figure 2, po-
tential hazard No. 123. Clearly, an aircraft costing
27

$14,000,000 (production estimate) was saved, positively!




Price of aircraft saved $14,000,000
Value of pilot (s) saved (unknown )
Resources saved over $14,000,000
** Cost of item 123 (560,000 )
*** BENEFIT $13,540,000
Clearly, $13,540,000 represents a real, defensible
direct-dollar savings. The benefit was enough to pay for
all systems safety programs ever contracted by the NAVAIR-
SYSCOM (see Figure 1) and still have monies left over.
More is said on this subject in Chapter II. B.
* Direct dollars only. At the time, early 1972, the
congressional mode was to slash defense budgets.
Had this potential hazard become a reality, an
indirect cost may well have been contract cancellation
** Cost of finding all 133 hazards, estimate 14 man years
@ $20,000/man year and 100% overhead.
*** Benefit from item 123. Benefit from remaining 132





Informal, unstructured interviews were held with safety
members from five major corporations. A number of subjects
were discussed, not all of which will appear here. Comments
germane to this thesis fell into three broad categories.




1. Contractors foresee lawsuits regarding safety
deficiencies they discover. They can do nothing
about them because insufficient dollars are
budgeted for Engineering Change Proposals (ECP's).
2. The contractor engineering personnel certification
requirements promulgated in MIL-STD-15 74 , System
Safety Program for Space and Missile Systems,
are unfair, unjust, restrictive precedent.
3. No research monies are being spent to improve
system safety technology.
4. Specific line items should be required in all
contracts to perpetuate the safety discipline





1. Too much safety data is requested by the government
in the Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL)
.
2. Statistical accident data provided by the govern-
ment at request of contractor is woefully deficient.
ADMINISTRATION
1. In a contest measuring effectiveness of respective
safety programs, the Air Force would be ranked
first, the Army second, the Navy last.
29

2. NAVAIRSYSCOM is grossly deficient in staffing
in observable areas such as evaluation of the
safety portion of contractor proposals, and in
ensuring contractor compliance with the safety
requirements of contracts.
3. The Navy Norfolk Safety Center has no clout in
contractual safety matters.
4. The Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the
NAVAIRSYSCOM are at odds with each other con-
cerning cause, disposition of identified
operational hazards and/or conditions.
5. Navy safety working groups are transient, lack
stability and appropriate expertise in System
Safety.




IV. THE STATE OF SYSTEM SAFETY IN GOVERNMENT
A. GENERAL
The specification governing System Safety activities
is MIL-STD-882, "System Safety Program for Systems and
Associated Subsystems Equipment." It was issued
15 July 1969 as a DOD specification superseding MIL-S-
38130A, an earlier Air Force safety specification. MIL-
STD-882 specifies that it "is mandatory for use by all
departments and agencies of the Department of Defense
effective 15 July 1969." It further states that:
1. (Par. 1.3.3) the safety life cycle "includes all
phases: concept formulation, contract definition (now
validation phase) development, production and operation."
2. (Par. 4.2.1.1) for concept phases "A preliminary
hazard analysis shall be performed as an integral part
of the system concept studies to identify inherent hazards,
or risks associated with each design."
Figure 5 illustrates the above-mentioned phases.
B. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS
1. The Concept Alternatives
When the government wishes to acquire a new weapons
system to satisfy a given or newly defined need, it does
not arbitrarily procure the first system proposed to satisfy


































once committed, are foregone for other uses, and that it
must make its decisions using some rational technique in
order to justify expending resources.
The technique advocated by the government is de-
scribed by DOD Instruction 7041.3, Economic Analysis and
Program Evaluation for Resource Management. Under "Policy,"
this instruction states that whenever resources are to be
committed to proposed new projects, an economic analysis
" is required ." It also states that Project Managers (PM's)
should be prepared to demonstrate cost effectiveness of
budget proposals. This involves defining the objective,
choosing alternatives, formulating assumptions, determining
costs and benefits, comparing alternatives, performing
uncertainty analysis and finally, making a decision.
To do a cost analysis, all of the resources that
are required to achieve meeting the new need or objective
are to be shown in the analysis, including all R&D costs,
all investment costs and all recurring costs.
Investment costs are costs associated with the ac-
quisition of equipment, all start-up and other one-time
investment costs. Recurring or operational costs include
personnel, material consumed, operating costs, overhead
costs, support costs, etc.
Present Value costs, Economic Life and Inflation
considerations are included in these analyses.
Benefits for each alternative are also considered.
Finally, an alternative is chosen which either minimizes
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costs, assuming benefits/outputs are equal; or maximizes
differential output per dollar difference when costs and
benefits are unequal.
2. The Operational Requirement (OR )
Ideas for a new weapons system come from a variety
of sources. Exploitation of a new technology, recognition
of a deficiency, the result of a threat analysis or other
studies of prototype programs or military exercises,
recognized old-age or obsolescence of current systems, etc.
are possible sources which generate ideas. Whatever the
source for the idea that results in a need, it must some-
how be communicated so that it may be officially recognized
and considered for approval. This process begins with the
preparation and submission of a document called an "OR,"
Operational Requirement; the Air Force's and Army's equi-
valent document is called "ROC" (Required Operational Capa-
bility) . Again referring to Figure 5, it can be seen that
the entire acquisition cycle begins with the OR.
An OR is a three-page document whose purpose is to
initiate a conceptual effort to meet an operational need.
It briefly describes: (1) the Operational Need ; identifies
threat parameters, opposition forces, deficiency in present
capability, and consequences of not satisfying the opera-
tional need; (2) the Operational Concepts : how the system
is to be used against the opposition, and (3) the Capabili-
ties Required: performance goals, alternatives, quantities,
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cost objectives (design to cost) , desired fleet introduc-
tion dates, etc.
Draft OR's may be submitted by any fleet activity
to a cognizant Force and Mission (F&M) sponsor. The sponsor
prepares the OR and controls and monitors its progress
throughout the entire acquisition cycle.
OR's are subjected to elaborate reviews. The ulti-
mate goal is approval of the OR by the Secretary of the
Navy so that it can be added to the Program Objective Mem-
orandum (POM) . The POM contains all of the requirements for
all appropriations separated for each of the major mission
categories. It represents a part of a long and involved
process which takes place to budget for and obtain funds
through the Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS)
and the Five-Year Defense Program (FYDP) process (Figure 6)
,
and continues into the fiscal cycle (Figure 7)
.
If a given subject such as described above, inclu-
ding System Safety is not addressed in the OR, it is not
addressed in the POM. If it is not addressed in the POM, it
doesn't get funded in the Figure 7 fiscal cycle.
Figures 8 and 9 identify the Navy concept phase
acquisition cycle and the documentation and approvals re-
quired. The Army and Air Force have a similar cycle.
3. Development Proposal
Once the OR is approved, the CNM is required to

















































































































































the technical approach the CNM will adopt to meet the
requirements of the OR. Alternative costs and effectiveness
comparisons, risks and other detailed back-up information
are included within the 20-page proposal. As shown in
Figure 9, the DP, then, is approved using either of three
recording documents, depending on (a) whether it is desig-
nated DOD Major or DOD Non-Major and (b) its dollar threshold,
All three recording instruments, DCP (Decision Coor-
dinating Paper, PM (Program Memorandum) and NBCP (Navy
Decision Coordinating Paper) contain essentially the same
information to different degrees of elaboration. All three
synopsize the elements of the OR.
If a particular subject such as System Safety is not
an element in the OR, it is not specifically a consideration
in the decisionmaking process leading to an approved DCP
and consequently, resources do not follow. The approved DCP
represents authority to begin the concept phase.
4 . Economic Analysis and Operational Requirements
Variances
a. General
If there is to be economic analysis, it should
be done early in the concept phase and it should specifically
include safety considerations. In evaluating aircraft design
alternatives, the analyst should consider such subtle air-
craft differences as handling qualities (control response,
engine throttle response, etc.), wind loading or other
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surrogate criteria. Considering carrier landing operations
between several alternatives, for example, such variables
as lift coefficient and wing area could have a profound
influence on carrier landing accident rates. There are rea-
sons an aircraft such as the A-5 historically has had high
accident rates (over 5 major accidents for each 10,000
flying hours) and the A- 6 has a much lower rate (less than
2 for each 10,000 hours). An economic safety analysis could
conceivably predict such differences.
b. Air Force Policy
The Air Force does perform economic analysis in
accordance with a published regulation (AFR 178-1) on sub-
jects such as "Base Closures. " It does not do economic
analysis on DOD hardware which goes through the DSARC pro-
cess described above and in Figures 5 and 8. In fact, one
regulation specifically forbids analysis of such equipments
since "enough analysis is done in the normal acquisition
cycle."
c. Army Policy
The Army does do economic analysis at HQ level
direction using AR 11-28 as their implementing directive,
and ATCD-AD-R Cost and Effectiveness Analysis Handbook
(TRADOC Pamphlet 11-8) as a guide.
HQ personnel perform economic analysis concern-




The Combat Development Analysis Office at Fort
Monroe, Virginia performs COEA's (Cost and Operations Effec-
tiveness Analysis) for all "DSARC cycle" major and selected
non-major projects. The Army has some 80 such projects in
being during a given year. About 12 of these projects sur-
vive the approval cycle; each includes a COEA.
System Safety is addressed in Army OR's.
d. Navy Policy
Over a half-dozen DOD/SECNAV/OPNAV directives
which lead to the preparation of a DCP exist. Only one dir-
ective for "Test and Evaluation" specifies that "Safety"
should be addressed (in a future TEMP—Test and Evaluation
Master Plan)
.
There is some question about whether or not
cost-benefit/economic analyses are being performed anytime
during the acquisition cycle by the Navy. Several PMA '
s
indicated economic analyses have not been performed on their
respective on-going projects. Several members in the CNM
(Chief of Naval Material) OR review cycle indicated econ-
omic analysis is not being done. However, a PMA member of
the VSTOL-A/CSTOL project indicated that a cost effective-
ness analysis will positively be done when alternatives
are sufficiently defined. A study to define alternatives
is currently taking place; six mission/need variances exist
at this time. In any event, a clear policy is not evident.
System safety is not and has not been imple-
mented as directed by implementing instructions into any
NAVAIR concept phase projects to date.
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Several of the major contractors interviewed
were asked if any concept phase contractual efforts per-
formed in the past included System Safety requirements.
The answer was "No"
I
System Safety has not been addressed in the OR
of any NAVAIRSYSCOM project to date.
5 . Summary
The Air Force does not perform economic analysis
on DOD hardware. The Army does, and system safety is a
consideration.
The Army and Air Force consider system safety in
the early planning phases. It is given consideration in
the Required Operational Capability (ROC—same as Navy OR)
and resources follow on approved projects.
The Navy essentially has not performed economic
analyses on projects, nor is system safety a consideration
in the OR cycle. Safety resources, of course, do not follow
C. PROJECT OFFICE AND SAFETY OFFICE RESPONSIBILITY
1. The following describes SAMSO (Space and Missile
Systems Organization) . SAMSO is an equivalent counterpart
organization corresponding to the NAVAIRSYSCOM.
a. General
The Safety Office is advised of the existence of
a project through receipt of a "Project Directive" (PD) for
which they are on automatic distribution. Contact by the
Safety Office is subsequently made with respective System
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Project Offices (SPO's) and matters dealing with RFP (Request
for Proposal) scopes, content, cost, schedule, and data, and
in-house administration are determined and exercised in
accordance with established policy.
b. Project Manager
Each project manager assigns a full time System
Safety representative within his SPO, where feasible.
Generally, major SPO's have full time safety representatives;
less than major projects have double-hatted representatives
as a minimum. Inexperienced safety assignees are required
to attend safety courses, usually four weeks at the Univer-
sity of Southern California.
c. Safety Representatives
SPO safety representatives prepare all RFP
contractual documentation. They participate in and are
responsible for the safety portion in the contractor bid-
response evaluation in the contractor source selection
process. They are responsible for the conduct of the
contractor/government safety program and for contractual
compliance assurance after award.
d. System Safety Office
The safety office within SAMSO (and other com-
mands) is essentially a staff office. It establishes
safety policy and promulgates it through "regulations"
and other documentation. All series regulations dealing
with project or contracting functions or which establish
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requirements in contracts (Statement of Work, Compliance
Documentation, Bidders Instructions, Boiler Plate, Data
Requirements Lists and associated Data Item Description, etc.)
have been modified to include appropriate system safety
program statements. A separate regulation series, a manual,
and other guides dealing specifically with System Safety is
prepared, published and promulgated. Finally, all MIL-STD's
and MIL-SPEC s for which SAMSO is the Office of Primary
Responsibility (OPR) are reviewed and safety inclusions
inserted where appropriate. All new MIL-SPEC 's and MIL-STD's
are routed through the office for comment.
The safety office is on automatic distribution
to receive all RFP ' s (about 300 to 400 each year) for approval
The safety office provides contractual support
to the SPO safety representative on a "when requested" basis.
Periodic reviews are held with each SPO safety representative;
usually once each month, individually and as part of an
Inspector General (IG) team, once a year. The staff system
safety officer attends SPO contractor/government System
Safety Working Group (SSWG) meetings on a spot-check basis to
assure compliance with published Air Force system safety
policy.
2. Army Responsibility
Lack of funds precluded extensive research. However,
it was learned that all regulations pertaining to project
functions and to the contract cycle have been reviewed for
inclusion of appropriate system safety statements, as was
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done by the Air Force. Regulations dealing specifically
with System Safety, however, are considered to be insuffici-
ent by the Army. Future action at the headquarters level
is planned.
This writer is aware that an Army guide exists
that explains System Safety in terms of the MIL-STD-882.
3. Navy Responsibility
a. General
The NAVAIRSYSCOM notifies its members of an
intent to acquire a new weapon system; as does the Air Force,
with a Project Directive. The NAVAIRSYSCOM safety office
is not included on the distribution list. The safety office
learns of new projects usually through informal channels
(hearsay, daily bulletin, notices, newspaper articles, maga-
zines such as Aviation Weekly, rumor, etc.).
b. Project Manager
At this writing, NAVAIR has 2 3 PMA * s (Project
Managers, Air) for as many NAVAIR designated weapons systems
projects. Each has a charter, a NAVAIR instruction. Each
charter identifies an individual by name and designates him
to be a "Principal for Safety Matters." The charter further
instructs the PMA that he "in collaboration with the Director,
Safety Office (AIR-09E) is responsible for ensuring the prepa-
ration and execution of an appropriate Naval Air Systems Com-
mand safety program for the project." No further instruction




With one exception, no PMA or PM Safety Principal
sought assistance from AIR-09E on his own initiative. With
the same exception and one other, all PMA's delegated respon-
sibility to administer safety matters to other organizations.
In any event, no Safety Principals nor their delegates
received any formal education or training of any kind to
perform this function. The business of managing a contractual
system safety program is done by a "Class Desk" as a collateral
duty in collaboration with the NAVAIR System Safety Office.
No NAVAIRSYSCOM instructions, directives, guides,
manuals are available to Safety Principals nor to their
delegates, save one short instruction, NAVAIRINST 5100. 3A,
regarding safety policy and responsibility.
d. System Safety Office
The safety office within the NAVAIRSYSCOM is
essentially a staff office. However, as collaborator with all
PMA's, the safety office functions as a line organization.
Upon learning about the existence of a new weapon system
project, the safety officer approaches the Project Manager
(PM) to explain the safety program, its purpose, intent, ob-
jective, and subsequently negotiates the scope, costs,
schedule, and data which are to be included in the proposed
RFP.
After award, the safety office arranges contrac-
tor/government safety meetings in behalf of the class desk
(usually four each year) , actively participates in them and
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is generally responsible for the conduct of the safety pro-
gram of all NAVAIR projects.
The safety office is, by NAVAIR instruction,
responsible for approving/disapproving all RFP ' s regarding
system safety. The office, however, is not on the RFP dis-
tribution list and only approves/disapproves those RFP '
s
which it specifically pursues.
4 . Summary
a. Navy and Air Force assign individual safety
representatives within respective project offices. Air Force
representatives actively pursue safety responsibilities;
Navy assignment in the PMA office is essentially perfunctory.
b. Project Directives, RFP ' s , and MIL-SPEC' s and
MIL-STD's are automatically distributed to Air Force Safety
Offices for review and approval; such distribution is not
accomplished in NAVAIR.
c. Army and Air Force have reviewed regulations
governing project and contract activity and have inserted
appropriate safety requirements. NAVAIR has yet to modify
similar instructions.
d. Air Force has provided regulations, guides,
manuals, etc., specifically addressing System Safety. The
Army has not completed this task but intends to. NAVAIR
has not accomplished this task.
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D. GOVERNMENT ACCIDENT DATA
1. General
Whenever an aircraft accident occurs, an investigation
takes place. Such investigation is conducted in accordance
with strict rules, regulations and procedures. All three
services perform the investigation in much the same way
although there are some subtle differences.
The purpose of an investigation is to ascertain its
cause so that action may be taken to preclude its recurrence
in another circumstance. In order to foster free, candid
expression, witnesses are made aware that any recorded inform-
ation will be treated with confidentially, and any accident
report will be treated as privileged information. Upon com-
pletion, the report is filed in a computer.
Contractors have access to "sanitized" reports (no
names, no aircraft tail number, etc.) provided they can
establish a "need to know" with the appropriate Safety Center.
A contract number generally satisfies the need-to-know
principal.
2. Safety Center Accident Data
The sanitized data above is useful to contractors.
According to the Air Force Safety Center, Norton AFB , full
time representatives from 45 major companies receive useful,
timely sanitized reports daily on such systems as F-4, T-39,
Cruise Missile, etc.
However, almost without exception, the safety
personnel interviewed stated emphatically that data from
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both the Air Force and Navy Safety Centers in its present
deliverable form is next to useless, that data they collect
themselves using the same data sources is of more benefit.
Bluntly, one contractor, echoing sentiments from the other
contractors, said that both Safety Centers are, "a repository
for dead data, a statistical graveyard," and that data, when
provided, is inadequate in substance and detail, and is
untimely.
3. Fleet System Safety Data
It was assumed that Navy operators in the field,
being intimately involved with weapons systems, are aware of
many potential hazards involved in their use. Further, that
if such knowledge were sent to appropriate System Safety
Officers, action could be taken to prevent such identified
potential hazards from being a reality. A questionnaire
completed by twenty fleet Commanding and Executive Officers
yielded the following results:
Although 17 of 20 officers heard of OSHA (Occupational
Safety and Health Act) and had strong feelings about its
implementation in the DOD, only 9 of 20 heard of System
Safety and only one of these had any direct involvement.
All were aware of the existence of potential cata-
strophic hazards having, in their opinion, a high probability
of occurring.
Most (12 officers) felt that the current U. R.
(Unsatisfactory Report) is a satisfactory reporting system;




Only 3 officers felt a "Safety Office" could help.
No U. R. or formal reports of any other nature labeled
"Potential Hazard" and request to prevent a potential occur-
rence have been received by the NAVAIR Safety Office.
4 . Summary
a. Safety Center Data, Air Force and Navy (Army
—
unknown) , is unsatisfactory in its present form for system
safety engineering use.
b. Fleet personnel have knowledge of existence of
potential hazards. Such data transfer, however, does not
take place.
c. Most officers never heard of "System Safety."
E. ADMINISTRATION OF SYSTEM SAFETY PROGRAM
1. General
A major system in the development phase progresses
from initial ideas, to paper, to prototype hardware system(s)
over a long period of time. This phase may last two to five
years depending on size and complexity of the system.
It is during this period that the bulk of safety
work is most profitably done. All possible potential hazards
should be anticipated and predicted at this time.
Typically, a weapon system is an assembly of many
subsystems, each of which could be considered as a system by
its respective designer. An airplane, for example, is com-
prised of hundreds of (sub) systems as hydraulic, power,
pneumatic, fire control, flight control, communications, air
conditioning, etc., etc. As each system being developed is
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crystalized, the task of safety personnel is to analyze it f
say, the Oxygen System , to determine what possible failure (s)
or operational sequence (s) could cause hazards. Production
hardware and/or a real-life operational environment is
assumed at this time. Having analyzed the Oxygen System, and
as the aircraft system progresses, safety personnel analyze
the whole airplane as an integrated system to determine if
hazardous interfaces exist between (sub) systems . For example,
given a safe Oxygen System and a safe Lube System now exist,
could it be possible during some future maintenance action
to inadvertently interconnect a lube line with an oxygen line
with consequent disaster? If so, a potential hazard is
reported and dealt with . If not, a potential hazard is re-
ported and dismissed .
During the course of a contractor's safety program,
both contractor and government personnel meet periodically
to discuss the uncovered potential hazards known to exist at
the time. The title given to this group is System Safety
Working Group (SSWG)
.
The health of a safety program is proportional to
the intensity of effort expended by the SSWG. The changes
effected on the aircraft and/or the changes to future opera-
tional procedures both of which were brought about by the
hazards found, are a measure of the SSWG success.
2. Air Force SSWG
All members of a project SSWG are chartered and,
with a few exceptions, participate in one specific project
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only . Membership includes the SPO ' s assigned safety repre-
sentative, and individuals having system safety expertise
from the Air Force Systems Command, Air Force Logistics
Command, the using command, the Air Force's Safety Center,
and other DOD and industry organizations as appropriate.
Meetings are held in accordance with the contract
schedule. These are generally held just prior to PDR (Pre-
liminary Design Review)
,
prior to CDR (Critical Design
Review) , and just prior to delivery of data packages affect-
ing explosives safety, nuclear safety or range safety
requirements. All members except the SPO safety representa-
tive use operational funds to cover travel expenses. The
SPO safety representative uses project funds.
The purpose of the SSWG is to discuss only those
hazards which the contractor cannot resolve himself because
of cost, performance, or schedule constraints. A require-
ment for membership is authority to make engineering decisions
at the SSWG meetings. Members are tasked to resolve hazards
brought to their attention at the meeting for presentation
at the next meeting. Individual government members also
perform safety analysis regarding systems for which they
have respective primary interest. "Concerns" found are re-
ported at the next SSWG meeting.
The Norton AFB Safety Center provides safety repre-
sentation for each project. Here too, with a few exceptions,
different members are assigned to different project teams.
Again, operational funds cover travel expenses. Depending
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on the project, as many as five members from different areas
(for example. Flight Safety Division, Life Sciences Division,
Analysis Division, Weapons System Division, etc.) participate
in a SSWG meeting, each performing his own analysis to find
hazards and to supplement the contractor's safety effort.
This process continues for the life of the contract.
3. Army SSWG
The Army's administrative style has not been researched
due to the lack of funds.
4. Navy SSWG
A formal chartering to identify a given project's
SSWG does not exist. Membership generally includes the Class
Desk, a member from the safety office, a member or two from
the Safety Center, and contractor safety and project personnel.
On some funded projects, a member from the safety office from
a field activity may attend. The NAVAIR Safety Office mem-
ber and the Safety Center member attend all other NAVAIR pro-
ject SSWG meetings.
Meetings are held quarterly in accordance with con-
tract requirements. All members, except the Safety Center
member (s) , use project money to cover travel expenses, an
added expense not felt by Air Force SPO counterparts. All
members except the field members employed on a few projects,
act as "advisors" to management. They do not routinely per-
form safety analysis. Field members under work task may
perform safety analysis to supplement contractor analysis.
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The purpose of the SSWG is to review all critical
and catastrophic hazards which were anticipated and discovered
by the contractor's safety personnel, whether resolved or not.
Additionally, all hazards still left open from previous meet-
ings are also reviewed. All identified potential hazards
remain "open" until closing action mutually acceptable to the
contractor's management representative and to the class desk
is completed. This iterative process continues until contract
completion.
The Norfolk, Va. Safety Center provides representation
on a select basis. Of the several hundred people employed
at the Center, only one individual, a civilian professional
engineer, carries the title "System Safety." If there is to
be safety representation, it is he who attends practically
all projects having Safety Center interest. Some select pro-
jects, as the F-14, have an officer assigned to it, in which
case two system safety members acting as advisors attend
formal SSWG. The Safety Center personnel do not perform
formal, scheduled system safety analyses on weapons systems
of their interest.
Requests for Safety Center attendance to SSWG meetings
are done on an individual basis. Attendance is uncertain
because of frequent operational travel fund shortages. In
order to offset this condition, several projects have funded
the Safety Center, again, an added expense not felt by the Air
Force SPO counterpart. In these cases, however, participation
and increased membership and support are assumed. On funded
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projects, NAVAIR receives on various occasions additional
Human Factors, Psychologist, Test Pilot, and Maintenance
engineering support.
5. Summary
Air Force's SSWG is chartered, organized. Navy's
SSWG is informal.
Air Force SSWG is composed of different members for
different projects. Each safety member is a decisionmaker
about some area of expertise. Navy safety experts are limited
to the same few system safety members. On funded projects,
additional support is obtained from the Safety Center and
from field activities.
Air Force SSWG members find hazards through analysis,
solve specific assigned problems in their areas of expertise.
NAVAIR safety members do not perform analyses; act as advisors,
Field activities perform safety analyses on funded projects
only.
Air Force members consistently have travel expenses
covered by operational funds. NAVAIR and NAVAIR field activ-
ity members have expenses covered by project funds. The




V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this study has been to examine the hypo-
thesis that barriers exist which preclude the utilization
of an effective System Safety technology and that these
barriers represent a significant barrier to the NAVAIRSYSCOM
in particular.
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. A number of significant barriers expressed by con-
tractor as well as government personnel do indeed exist.
Some of the problems prevent effective implementation of the
safety discipline. All of the below are particularly signi-
ficant for the NAVAIRSYSCOM.
2. Directives exist which mandate the performance of
Systems Safety Requirements in the total acquisition process
in accordance with a System Safety Spec. MIL-STD-882.
3. DOD directives and instructions which implement Sys-
tem Safety policies in mainline documentation in both the
Fiscal Cycle and the Acquisition Cycle do not exist.
4. Except for one directive (OPNAVINST 3960.10, dealing
with a Test and Evaluation Master Plan) , all mainline Navy
instructions leading to contractual requirements in both
concept and development phases of weapons systems acquisition




5. Funds to implement "System Safety" specifically are
not budgeted for NAVAIRSYSCOM developmental projects in the
concept phase
.
6. Funds to implement "System Safety" specifically are
not bureaucratically , directly budgeted within NAVAIR pro-
jects in development phases.
7. Typically, the first request for funds from a NAVAIR
Project Manager for system safety expenditures may surface
at the time a Purchase Request/Request for Proposal is pre-
pared for an approved weapon system. This occurs long after
the planned and approved budget cycle in which case funds
for safety are doled in competition with and at the expense
of other line items.
8. Economic analyses in accordance with DOD directive
70 41.3 are not routinely performed for major projects during
the early phases of weapons systems acquisition by the Navy
and Air Force. Analyses are routinely performed by the
Army. Documentation (instructions, directives, regulations)
implementing the above directive is written such that "sys-
tem safety," specifically is not addressed. "Risk" addressed
in the above and other Navy Economic Analysis directives is,
by concensus of personnel interviewed, construed to mean
"technical" vice "accident" risk.
9. A DOD policy which directs cost-benefit determinations
to assess degree of safety among possible weapons systems
alternatives does not exist.
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10. A DOD policy with descriptive implementing System
Safety instruction does not exist.
11. Descriptive NAVAIR System Safety Program documenta-
tion (instructions, manuals, guides, etc.) does not exist.
12. The direct safety representation and activity speci-
fied in project charters in NAVAIR PMA's exist in name only.
Assignments are perfunctory except in the case of two or
three projects.
13. NAVAIR' s safety office span of control over all pro-
jects is so vast as to render the system safety office pro-
ductivity ineffectual.
14. A viable system safety program saves resources. Just
how much is saved cannot be estimated at the present time.
Research to determine cost and benefit is needed.
15. NAVSAFECEN policy regarding appointment to and par-
ticipation in NAVAIR system safety projects does not exist.
16. Data from government safety center banks are completely
unsatisfactory in their present form for system safety
application.
B . RECOMMENDATI ONS
1. DOD Director of Safety Policy: Issue a joint service
DOD policy specifically addressing "System Safety."
2. DOD: Direct modification of all mainline acquisition




3. DOD; Review peripheral documentation such as DOD
Directive 7041.3, Economic Analysis. Decide whether the
above item 1 policy applies and, of so, direct appropriate
changes.
4. DOD: Direct creation of a task force composed of
representatives from the three services, NASA, and other
agencies to "compare notes" regarding their respective oper-
ating procedures, techniques, rules, regulations, etc.
Objective: Adoption of most effective issues for improved
performance by each organization.
5. DOD/CNO/CNM/SYSCOM's in turn: Determine if system
safety is to be a positive force. If so, direct its imple-
mentation into mainline documentation. If not, abolish the
Safety Standard and all associated documentation.
6. CNO/CNM/SYSCOM's in turn: If above item 4 is deter-
mined to be positive, solicit funds independent of project
funds , through the fiscal cycle to permit:
a. promotional education.
b. adequate training of full time, dedicated System
Safety members.
c. appropriate instruction to all hierarchal levels;
SYSCOM line levels, PMA's, CNM/CNO functional levels, CNO
sponsors, etc.
d. independent participation in projects.
e. study contracts which could result in:
(1) improved analytic techniques.
(2) better ways to establish project costs.
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(3) ways to measure output benefits.
(4) improved data transfer (possibly a common
service, DOD Safety Center data bank)
.
7. NAVAIRSYSCOM Safety Office:
a. solicit NAVAIR funds to:
(1) prepare and publish descriptive system
safety guides, manuals and instructions.
(2) have sufficient operating/travel funds to
accomplish above publications.
(3) have sufficient operating funds to monitor
various safety programs independent of project funds.
(4) adequately train PMA safety principals,
and to provide minimal indoctrination for promotional instruc-
tion for other NAVAIR hierarchal levels.
b. relinquish line tasks (as prepare RFP verbage,
administer individual NAVAIR projects, etc.) and delegate
same to assigned PMA Safety Principal. Prepare a NAVAIRINST
amplifying the tasks of respective PMA Safety Principals
named in project charters.
c. establish, promulgate a clear, specific relation-







1. Have you heard of "OSHA" prior to enrolling in the NPS
Executive Safety Course? Yes No
2. (Answer this question only if you are familiar with OSHA
policies and objectives) Should OSHA, in your opinion, have
relevance to:
a. shore activities? Yes No don't know
b. ship activities? Yes No don't know
SYSTEM SAFETY
3. Have you heard the term "System Safety" prior to your NPS
safety course enrollment? Yes No
a. If yes, what were the circumstances? (Was it a
casual or direct involvement? If system hardware [F-14, S3A,
AIM9L, etc.] was involved, please identify)
4. Considering your operational environment, how many hazards
could you conjure within the next two minutes that would fit
each of the following (check off as appropriate)
POTENTIAL HAZARDS
Probability of Consequences Quantity of separate
Occurrence if occur events
a. Low Low / 1 / 2-4 z over 5
b. Low High r 1 r 2-4 , over 5
c. High Low i 1 i 2-4 , over 5
d. High High i 1 i 2-4 , over 5
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5. a. The existence of a hazard is only one of potentiality;
it may not happen.
b. Low probability hazards are not likely to be reported
using present communication channels (formal-UR; informal-
verbal; telecon and other (fill in)
.
c. Underlings aware of "potential" hazards will not always
choose to reveal them (too trite, censure, too much bother and
red tape, too busy, distracted, etc., etc.)
Considering the above, in order to identify potential hazards,
are our current communication channels (pick one)
:
(1) good enough?
(2) should they be expanded?
(3) should they be abandoned in favor of
another scheme?
6. Assume that an efficient, acceptable channel to report
potential hazards exists. Who, in your opinion, should be the
recipient to collect such information, and determine, direct,
and control corrective action? (Check off as appropriate)
a. a central DOD agency
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